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ABSTRACT
Since 2016, multiple microarchitectural attacks have exploited an
effect that is attributed to prefetching. These works observe that
certain user-space operations can fetch kernel addresses into the
cache. Fetching user-inaccessible data into the cache enables KASLR
breaks and assists various Meltdown-type attacks, especially Fore-
shadow.
In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of the root cause
of this prefetching effect. While we confirm the empirical results
of previous papers, we show that the attribution to a prefetching
mechanism is fundamentally incorrect in all previous papers de-
scribing or exploiting this effect. In particular, neither the prefetch
instruction nor other user-space instructions actually prefetch ker-
nel addresses into the cache,1 leading to incorrect conclusions and
ineffectiveness of proposed defenses. The effect exploited in all
of these papers is, in fact, caused by speculative dereferencing of
user-space registers in the kernel. Hence, mitigation techniques
such as KAISER do not eliminate this leakage as previously be-
lieved. Beyond our thorough analysis of these previous works, we
also demonstrate new attacks enabled by understanding the root
cause, namely an address-translation attack in more restricted con-
texts, direct leakage of register values in certain scenarios, and the
first end-to-end Foreshadow (L1TF) exploit targeting non-L1 data.
The latter is effective even with the recommended Foreshadow
mitigations enabled and thus revives the Foreshadow attack. We
demonstrate that these dereferencing effects exist even on the most
recent Intel CPUs with the latest hardware mitigations, and on
CPUs previously believed to be unaffected, i.e., ARM, IBM, and
AMD CPUs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern system security depends on isolating domains from each
other. One domain cannot access information from the other do-
main, e.g., another process or the kernel. Hence, the goal of many at-
tacks is to break this isolation and obtain information from other do-
mains. Microarchitectural attacks like Foreshadow [94, 98] andMelt-
down [57] gained broad attention due to their impact andmitigation
cost. One building block that facilitates microarchitectural attacks is
knowledge of physical addresses. Knowledge of physical addresses
can be used for various side-channel attacks [24, 38, 58, 61, 75],
1Various authors of papers exploiting the prefetching effect confirmed that the ex-
planation put forward in this paper indeed explains the observed phenomena more
accurately than their original explanations. We believe it is in the nature of empir-
ical science that theories explaining empirical observations improve over time and
root-cause attributions become more accurate.
bypassing SMAP and SMEP [43], and mounting Rowhammer at-
tacks [7, 41, 46, 76, 86, 102]. As a mitigation to these attacks, operat-
ing systems do not make physical address information available to
user programs [48]. Hence, the attacker has to leak the privileged
physical address information first. The address-translation attack by
Gruss et al. [22] solves this problem.2 The address-translation attack
allows unprivileged applications to fetch arbitrary kernel addresses
into the cache and thus resolve virtual to physical addresses on 64-
bit Linux systems. As a countermeasure against microarchitectural
side-channel attacks on kernel isolation, e.g., the address-translation
attack, Gruss et al. [21, 22] proposed the KAISER technique.
More recently, other attacks observed and exploited similar
prefetching effects. Lipp et al. [57] described that Meltdown suc-
cessfully leaks memory that is not in the L1 cache, but did not
thoroughly explain why this is the case. Xiao et al. [103] show that
this is only possible due to a prefetching effect, when performing
Meltdown-US, where data is fetched from the L3 cache into the
L1 cache. Van Bulck et al. [94] observe that for Foreshadow this
effect does not exist. Foreshadow is still limited to the L1, however
in combination with Spectre gadgets which fetch data from other
cache levels it is possible to bypass current L1TF mitigations. This
statement was further mentioned as a restriction by Canella et al.
[11] and Nilsson et al. [68]. Van Schaik et al. state that Meltdown is
not fully mitigated by L1D flushing [96].
We systematically analyze the root cause of the prefetching effect
exploited in these works. We first empirically confirm the results
from these papers, underlining that these works are scientifically
sound, and the evaluation is rigorous. We then show that, despite
the scientifically sound approach of these papers, the attribution of
the root cause, i.e., why the kernel addresses are cached, is incorrect
in all cases. We discovered that this prefetching effect is actually
unrelated to software prefetch instructions or hardware prefetching
effects due to memory accesses and instead is caused by speculative
dereferencing of user-space registers in the kernel. While there
are multiple code paths which trigger speculative execution in the
kernel, we focus on a code path containing a Spectre-BTB [11, 49]
gadget which can be reliably triggered on both Linux andWindows.
Based on our new insights, we correct several assumptions from
previous works and present several new attacks exploiting the
underlying root cause. We demonstrate that an attacker can, in
certain cases, observe caching of the address (or value) stored in a
register of a different context. Based on this behavior, we present
a cross-core covert channel that does not rely on shared memory.
2This attack is detailed in Section 3.3 and Section 5 of the Prefetch Side-Channel
Attacks paper [22]
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While Spectre “prefetch” gadgets, which fetch data from the last-
level cache into higher levels, are known [11], we show for the
first time that they can directly leak actual data. Schwarz et al. [82]
showed that prefetch gadgets can be used as a building block for
ZombieLoad on affected CPUs to not only leak data from internal
buffers but to leak arbitrary data from memory. We show that
prefetch gadgets are even more powerful by also leaking data on
CPUs unaffected by ZombieLoad. Therefore, we demonstrate for
the first time data leakage with prefetch gadgets on non-Intel CPUs.
The implications of our insights affect the conclusions of several
previous works. Most significantly, the difference that Meltdown
can leak from L3 or main memory [57] but Foreshadow (L1TF)
can only leak from L1 [94]3, was never true in pratice. For both,
Meltdown and Foreshadow, the data has to be fetched in the L1
to get leaked. However, this restriction can be bypassed by ex-
ploiting prefetch gadgets to fetch data into L1. Therefore L1TF
was in practice never restricted to the L1 cache, due to the same
“prefetch” gadgets in the kernel and hypervisor that were exploited
in Meltdown. Because of these gadgets, mounting the attack merely
requires moving addresses from the hypervisor’s address space
into the registers. Hence, we show that specific results from pre-
vious works are only reproducible on kernels that still have such
a “prefetch” gadget, including, e.g., Gruss et al. [22],4 Lipp et al.
[57],5, Xiao et al. [103]6. We also show that van Schaik et al. [96]
(Table III [96]) erroneously state that L1D flushing does not mitigate
Meltdown.
We then show that certain attacks can be mounted in JavaScript
in a browser, as the previous assumptions about the root cause were
incorrect. For instance, we recover physical addresses of a JavaScript
variable to be determined with cache-line granularity et al. [22].
Knowledge of physical addresses of variables aids Javascript-based
transient-execution attacks [49, 63], Rowhammer attacks [23, 41],
cache attacks [71], and DRAMA attacks [83].
We then show that we can mount Foreshadow attacks on data
not residing in L1 on kernel versions containing “prefetch” gadgets.
Worse still, we show that for the same reason Foreshadow mitiga-
tions [94, 98] are incomplete. We reveal that a full mitigation of
Foreshadow attacks additionally requires Spectre-BTB mitigations
(nospectre_v2), a fact that was not known or documented so far.
We demonstrate that the prefetch address-translation attack also
works on recent Intel CPUs with the latest hardware mitigations.
Finally, we also demonstrate the attack on CPUs previously believed
to be unsusceptible to the prefetch address-translation attack, i.e.,
ARM, IBM Power9, and AMD CPUs.
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are:
(1) We empirically confirm the results of previous works whilst
discovering an incorrect attribution of the root cause [22, 57,
103].
(2) We show that the underlying root cause is speculative execution.
Therefore, CPUs from other hardware vendors like AMD, ARM,
3Appendix Foreshadow’s Cache Requirement [94] and subsequently also reported by
Canella et al. [11] (Table 4 [11]), and Nilsson [68] (Section III.E [68].
4The address-translation oracle in Section 3.3 and Section 5 of the Prefetch Side-
Channel Attacks paper [22].
5The L3-cached and uncached Meltdown experiments in Section 6.2 [57].
6The L3-cached experiment in Section IV-E [103].
and IBM are also affected. Furthermore, the effect can even be
triggered from JavaScript.
(3) We discover a novel way to exploit speculative dereferences,
enabling direct leakage of data values stored in registers.
(4) We show that this effect, responsible for Meltdown from non-L1
data, can be adapted to Foreshadow by using addresses not valid
in any address space of the guest.
(5) We analyze the implications for Meltdown and Foreshadow
attacks and show that Foreshadow attacks on data from the L3
cache are possible, even with Foreshadow mitigations enabled,
when the unrelated Spectre-BTB mitigations are disabled.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide background on virtual memory, cache attacks,
and transient-execution attacks. In Section 3, we analyze the under-
lying root cause of the observed effect. In Section 4, we demonstrate
the same effect on different architectures and improve the leakage
rate. In Section 5, we measure the capacity using a covert channel.
In Section 6, we demonstrate an attack from a virtual machine. In
Section 7, we leak actual data with seemingly harmless prefetch
gadgets. In Section 8, we present a JavaScript-based attack leaking
physical and virtual address information. In Section 9, we discuss
the implications of our attacks. We conclude in Section 10.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we provide a basic introduction to address transla-
tion, CPU caches, cache attacks, Intel SGX, and transient execution.
We also introduce transient-execution attacks and defenses.
2.1 Address Translation
Virtual memory is a cornerstone of today’s system-level isolation.
Each process has its own virtual memory space and cannot ac-
cess memory outside of it. In particular, processes cannot access
arbitrary physical memory addresses. The KAISER patch [21] in-
troduces a strong isolation between user-space and address space,
meaning that kernel memory is not mapped when running in user-
space. Before the KAISER technique was applied, the virtual address
space of a user process was divided into the user and kernel space.
The user address space was mapped as user-accessible while the
kernel space was only accessible when the CPU was running in
kernel mode. While the user’s virtual address space looks different
in every process, the kernel address space looks mostly identical in
all processes. To switch from user mode to kernel mode, the x86_64
hardware requires that parts of the kernel are mapped into the
virtual address space of the process. When a user thread performs a
syscall or handles an interrupt, the hardware simply switches into
kernel mode and continues operating in the same address space.
The difference is that the privileged bit of the CPU is set, and kernel
code is executed instead of the user code. Thus, the entire user
and kernel address mappings remain generally unchanged while
operating in kernel mode. As sandboxed processes also use a regu-
lar virtual address space that is primarily organized by the kernel,
the kernel address space is also mapped in an inaccessible way in
sandboxed processes.
Many operating systems map physical memory directly into
the kernel address space [44, 54], as shown in Figure 1, e.g., to
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Physical memory
Non-canonical
Kernel
Direct-physical map
User space
Virtual memory per process
0x0000 0000 0000 0000
0x0000 8000 0000 0000
0xffff 8880 0000 0000
0xffff 8000 0000 0000
Figure 1: Physical memory is mapped into the huge virtual
address space.
access paging structures and other data in physical memory. Para-
virtualizing hypervisors also employ a direct map of physical mem-
ory [101]. Thus, every user page is mapped at least twice: once in
user space and once in the kernel direct map. When performing
operations on either one of the two virtual addresses, the CPU trans-
lates the corresponding address to the same physical address. The
CPU then performs the operation based on the physical address.
For security reasons, access to virtual-to-physical address in-
formation requires root privileges [48]. The address-translation
attack described in the Prefetch Side-Channel Attacks paper [22]
obtains the physical address for any virtual address mapped in user
space without root privileges. For the sake of brevity, we do not
discuss the translation-level oracle also described in the Prefetch
Side-Channel Attacks paper [22] which is an orthogonal attack and,
to the best of our knowledge, works as described in the paper.
2.2 CPU Caches
Modern CPUs have multiple cache levels, hiding latency by buffer-
ing slower memory levels. Page tables are stored in memory and
thus are cached by the regular data caches [35]. Page translation
data is also stored in dedicated caches, called translation-lookaside
buffers (TLBs), to speed up address translation. Software prefetch
instructions hint to the CPU that a memory address will soon be
accessed in execution and so it should be fetched into the cache
early to improve performance. However, the CPU can ignore these
hints [34]. Intel and AMD x86 CPUs have five software prefetch in-
structions: prefetcht0, prefetcht1, prefetcht2, prefetchnta,
prefetchw, and on some models the prefetchwt1. On ARMv8-A
CPUs we can instead use the prfm instruction and on IBM Power9
the dcbt instruction.
2.3 Cache Attacks
Cache attacks have been studied for more than two decades [5, 50,
72–74, 89]. Today, most attacks use either Prime+Probe [72], where
an attacker occupies parts of the cache and waits for eviction due
to cache contention with the victim, or Flush+Reload [104], where
an attacker removes specific (read-only) shared memory from the
cache and waits for a victim process to reload it. Prime+Probe
has been used for many powerful cross-core covert channels and
attacks [56, 58, 62, 71, 78, 81, 105]. Flush+Reload requires shared
(read-only) memory, but is more accurate and thus has been the
technique of choice in local cross-core attacks [25, 26, 39, 40, 106].
Flush+Reload has been used as a more generic primitive to test
whether a memory address is in the cache or not [49, 57, 80, 94].
Prefetching attacks. Gruss et al. [22] observed that software
prefetches appear to succeed on inaccessible memory. Using this
effect on the kernel direct-physical map enables the user to fetch
arbitrary physical memory into the cache. The attacker guesses
the physical address for a user-space address, tries to prefetch the
corresponding address in the kernel’s direct-physical map, and
then uses Flush+Reload on the user-space address. If Flush+Reload
observes a hit, then the guess was correct. Hence, the attacker
can determine the exact physical address for any virtual address,
re-enabling side-channel [62, 75] and Rowhammer attacks [46, 86].
2.4 Intel SGX
Intel SGX is a trusted execution mechanism enabling the execution
of trusted code in a separate protected area called an enclave. This
feature was introduced with the Skylake microarchitecture as an
instruction-set extension [35]. The hardware prevents access to
the code or data of the enclave from any source other than the
enclave code itself [37]. All code running outside of the enclave
is treated as untrusted in SGX. Thus, code containing sensitive
data is protected in the enclave even if the host operating system
or hypervisor is compromised. Enclave memory is mapped in the
virtual address space of the host application but is inaccessible to
the host. The enclave has full access to the virtual address space
of its host application to share data between enclave and host.
However, as has been shown in the past, it is possible to exploit SGX
via memory corruption [52, 80], ransomware [85], side-channel
attacks [9, 81], and transient-execution attacks [82, 94, 96].
2.5 Transient Execution
Modern CPUs split instructions into micro-operations (µOPs) [18].
The µOPs can be executed out of order to improve performance
and later on retire in order from reorder buffers. However, the out-
of-order stream of µOPs is typically not linear. There are branches
which determine which instructions, and thereby µOPs, follow next.
This is not only the case for control-flow dependencies but also
data-flow dependencies. As a performance optimization, modern
CPUs rely on prediction mechanisms which predict which direction
should be taken or what the condition value will be. The CPU then
speculatively continues based on its control-flow or data-flow pre-
diction. If the prediction was correct, the CPU utilized its resources
more efficiently and saved time. Otherwise, the results of the ex-
ecuted instructions are discarded, and the architecturally correct
path is executed instead. This technique is called speculative execu-
tion. Intel CPUs have multiple branch prediction mechanisms [34],
including the Branch History Buffer (BHB) [6, 49], Branch Tar-
get Buffer (BTB) [17, 49, 53], Pattern History Table (PHT) [18, 49],
and Return Stack Buffer (RSB) [18, 51, 60]. Lipp et al. [57] defined
instructions executed out-of-order or speculatively but not archi-
tecturally as transient instructions. These transient instructions can
have measurable side effects, e.g., modification of TLB and cache
state. In transient-execution attacks, these side effects are then
measured.
2.6 Transient-Execution Attacks & Defenses
As transient execution can leave traces in the microarchitectural
state, attackers can exploit these state changes to extract sensitive
information. This class of attacks is known as transient-execution at-
tacks [1, 11]. In Meltdown-type attacks [57] an attacker deliberately
accesses memory across isolation boundaries, which is possible due
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to deferred permission checks in out-of-order execution. Spectre-
type attacks [12, 27, 47, 49, 51, 60, 84] exploit misspeculation in
a victim context. The attacker may facilitate this misspeculation,
e.g., by mistraining branch predictors. By executing along the mis-
speculated path, the victim inadvertently leaks information to the
attacker. To mitigate Spectre-type attacks several mitigations were
developed [33]. For instance, retpoline [32] replaces indirect jump
instructions with ret instructions. Therefore, the speculative exe-
cution path of the ret instruction is fixed to a certain path (e.g. to
an endless loop) and does not misspeculate on potential code paths
that contain Spectre gadgets. Foreshadow [94] is a Meltdown-type
attack exploiting a cleared present bit in the page table-entry. It
only works on data in the L1 cache or the line fill buffer [82, 96],
which means that the data must have been recently accessed prior
to the attack. An attacker cannot directly access the targeted data
from the Foreshadow attack context, and hence a widely accepted
mitigation is to flush the L1 caches and line fill buffers upon context
switches and to disable hyperthreading [31].
3 FROM ADDRESS-TRANSLATION ATTACK
TO FORESHADOW-L3
In this section, we systematically analyze the properties of the
address-translation attack that were erroneously explained to be
caused by the insecure behavior of software prefetch instructions.7
We show that the address-translation attack [22] originally moti-
vating the KAISER technique [21] was never related to prefetch
instructions. Instead, it exploits a Spectre-BTB gadget [11] in the
kernel and, as such, is not mitigated by the KAISER technique.8
In the address-translation attack [22] the attacker tries to verify
whether two virtual addresses p and p¯ map to the same physical
address. For instance, on Linux, the corresponding direct-physical
map address in the kernel can be used to verify the mapping. The
attacker first flushes the user-space virtual address p. Then, the
inaccessible (direct physical map address) p¯ is prefetched using a
software prefetch instruction. The address p is reloaded, and the
timing of the reload is checked to verify whether the address is
cached or uncached. If a cache hit is observed, the inaccessible
virtual address p¯ maps to the same physical address as the virtual
addressp. This procedure of flushing and reloading a virtual address
is referred to as Flush+Reload [104]. The Flush+Reload part of the
address-translation attack has an F1-Score very close to 1 [104],
meaning that if there is a cache hit, it will be observed in virtu-
ally every case. The limiting factor of the attack is the probability
that the guessed address is successfully “prefetched”, as not every
“prefetch” attempt brings the target address into the cache. Hence,
we measure the attack performance in successful fetches per second.
More fetches per second means a shorter time to mount an attack,
e.g., one successful cache fetch enables leakage of 64 bytes in a
Foreshadow attack, despite Foreshadow mitigations being enabled.
7This attack is detailed in Section 3.3 and Section 5 of the Prefetch Side-Channel Attacks
paper [22]. It should not be confused with the translation-level oracle described in
Section 3.2 and Section 4 of that paper [22], which to the best of our knowledge has a
correct technical explanation. We focus on the part that the authors confirmed to be
incorrect, i.e., the address-translation attack in Section 3.3 and Section 5.
8This was also independently confirmed by authors of the Prefetch Side-Channel
Attacks paper [22] that are not co-authors of this paper.
1 for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
2 sched_yield();
3 prefetch(direct_phys_map_addr);
4 }
Listing 1: Original code of the released proof-of-concept im-
plementation for the address-translation attack [29] from
Gruss et al. [22].14The code “prefetches” a (guessed) phys-
ical address from the direct physical map. If the “prefetch”
was successful and the physical address guess correct, the at-
tacker subsequently observes a cache hit on the correspond-
ing user-space address.
1 ; %r14 contains the direct physical address
2 12b6: e8 c5 fd ffff callq 1080 <sched_yield@plt>
3 12bb: 41 0f 18 06 prefetchnta (%r14)
4 12bf: 41 0f 18 1e prefetcht2 (%r14)
5 12c3: e8 b8 fd ffff callq 1080 <sched_yield@plt>
6 12c8: 41 0f 18 06 prefetchnta (%r14)
7 12cc: 41 0f 18 1e prefetcht2 (%r14)
8 12d0: e8 ab fd ffff callq 1080 <sched_yield@plt>
9 12d5: 41 0f 18 06 prefetchnta (%r14)
10 12d9: 41 0f 18 1e prefetcht2 (%r14)
Listing 2: Disassembly of the prefetching component of the
prefetch address-translation attack.
The prefetching component of the original attack’s proof-of-
concept implementation [29] is shown in Listing 1. The compiled
and disassembled code can be found in Listing 2. We analyze the
original attack and observe the following requirements are de-
scribed for the address-translation attack to succeed:
H1 the prefetch instruction (to instruct the prefetcher to prefetch);9
H2 the value stored in the register used by the prefetch instruc-
tion (to indicatewhich address the prefetcher should prefetch);10
H3 the sched_yield syscall (to give time to the prefetcher);11
H4 the use of the userspace_accessible bit (as kernel addresses
could otherwise not be translated in a user context);12
H5 an Intel CPU – the “prefetching” effect only occurs on Intel
CPUs, and other CPU vendors are not affected.13
We test each of the above hypotheses in this section.
3.1 H1: Prefetch instruction required
The first hypothesis is that the prefetch instruction is necessary
for the address-translation attack. The reasoning is that the instruc-
tion causes the prefetcher to start prefetching the provided address
even though the permission check for this address fails. To test
this hypothesis, we replaced the prefetch instructions with nop
9“Our attacks are based on weaknesses in the hardware design of prefetch instruc-
tions” [22].
10“2. Prefetch (inaccessible) address p¯ . 3. Reload p . [...] the prefetch of p¯ in step 2 leads
to a cache hit in step 3 with a high probability.” [22] with emphasis added.
11“[...] delays were introduced to lower the pressure on the prefetcher.” [22]. These
delays were implemented using a different number of sched_yield system calls, as
can also be seen in the original attack code [29].
12“Prefetch can fetch inaccessible privileged memory into various caches on Intel
x86.” [22] and corresponding NaCl results.
13“[...] we were not able to build an address-translation oracle on [ARM] Android. As
the prefetch instructions do not prefetch kernel addresses [...]” [22] describing why it
does not work on ARM-based Android devices.
14This attack is detailed in Section 3.3 and Section 5 of the Prefetch Side-Channel At-
tacks paper [22] and should not be confused with the translation-level oracle described
in Section 3.2 and Section 4 of the Prefetch Side-Channel Attacks paper [22].
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1 ; %r14 contains the direct physical address
2 12b6: e8 c5 fd ffff callq 1080 <sched_yield@plt>
3 12bb: 0f 1f 40 00 nop
4 12bf: 0f 1f 40 00 nop
5 12c3: e8 b8 fd ffff callq 1080 <sched_yield@plt>
6 12c8: 0f 1f 40 00 nop
7 12cc: 0f 1f 40 00 nop
8 12d0: e8 ab fd ffff callq 1080 <sched_yield@plt>
9 12d5: 0f 1f 40 00 nop
10 12d9: 0f 1f 40 00 nop
Listing 3: The prefetch instructions in the address-
translation attack are replaced by 4-byte nops.
instructions of the same length, as shown in Listing 3. Surprisingly,
the empirical result for this modified attack is identical to the origi-
nal attack: there is no change in the number of cache fetches, even
though there is no prefetch instruction in the code. In both cases,
approx. 60 cache fetches per second occur (on an i7-8700K, Ubuntu
18.10 with kernel 4.15.0-55)15 Hence, as the empirical result for
the address-translation attack does not change with or without the
prefetch instruction, we conclude that the prefetch instruction
is not a requirement for the address-translation attack.16
3.2 H2: Values in registers required
The second hypothesis is that providing the direct-physical map
address via the register is necessary.We reproduced the results from
Gruss et al. [22], i.e., that a virtual address stored in the register is
the one fetched into the cache in the address-translation attack.
While we already excluded software prefetching as the root
cause, the original code (cf. Listing 1 and the modified attack code
from Listing 3) could, in fact, trigger a hardware prefetcher. There
are patents describing CPUs that train a predictor whenever a
register value is dereferenced to prefetch memory locations pointed
to by register values ahead of time in subsequent runs, reducing
instruction latency [36]. We disable all hardware prefetchers via the
model-specific register 0x1a4 [97] and rerun the experiment from
H1. In this experiment, we still observe approx. 60 cache fetches
per second, i.e., disabling the prefetchers has no effect. Hence, this
already rules out any of the documented prefetchers as the root
cause.
We run the modified address-translation attack uninterrupted
and without context switches (and without sched_yield) on one
core. In this experiment, we do not observe any cache fetches
on our i7-8700K with Linux 4.15.0-55 when running this address-
translation attack for 10 hours on an isolated core (i.e., no interrupts).
Hence, we conclude that it is not pure register loading that triggers
the effect. Still, the value in the register influences what is fetched
into the cache.
The registers that must be used vary across kernel versions.17
On Ubuntu 18.10 (kernel 4.18.0-17), we observe cache hits if the
registers r12,r13 and r14 are filled. If we omit these registers, we
15We used the original code fromGitHub for comparison [29] that was used to generate
Figure 6 in their paper [22].
16To the best of our knowledge, it is required for the other attack, i.e., the translation-
level oracle, presented by Gruss et al. [22].
17The original paper describes that “delays were introduced to lower the pressure on the
prefetcher” [22]. In fact, this was done via recompilation. Note that recompilation with
additional code inserted may have side effects such as a different register allocation,
that we analyze in this subsection.
do not observe any cache hits. On Debian 8 (kernel 4.19.28-2 and
Kali Linux 5.3.9-1kali1), the registers r9 and r10 cause the leak-
age and on Linux Mint 19 (kernel 4.15.0-52) rdi and rdx cause
the leakage. Regardless of the kernel version, we observe many
cache hits when prefetching a user-space address via instruction-
pointer-relative addressing, i.e., the virtual address to prefetch is
never in a register. However, there is no cache hit if we use an
instruction-pointer-relative address pointing into the kernel ad-
dress space. Similarly, when specifying the target address using an
x86 complex addressingmode, we only see prefetches for user-space
addresses but not for kernel-space addresses. We only confirmed
leakage if absolute virtual addresses are placed in registers.
We developed a variant of the address-translation attack, which
loads the address into most of the general-purpose registers. This
variant consistently works across all Linux versions, even with
KAISER enabled. Thus, the KAISER technique never protected
against this attack. Instead, the implementation merely changed
the required registers, mitigating only the specific attack implemen-
tation and attack binary. On an Intel Xeon Silver 4208 CPU, which
has in-silicon patches against Meltdown [57], Foreshadow, [94]
and ZombieLoad [82], we still observe about 30 cache fetches per
second on Ubuntu 19.04 (kernel 5.0.0-25).
On Windows 10 (build 1803.17134), there is no direct physical
mapping we can use to fetch addresses into the cache and verify
the mapping. We fill all general-purpose registers with a kernel
address and perform the syscall SwitchToThread. Afterwards, we
perform Flush+Reload in a kernel driver to verify the speculative
dereferencing in the kernel. We observe about 15 cache fetches per
second for our kernel address.
3.3 H3: sched_yield required
The third hypothesis is that the sched_yield syscall is required
for the address-translation attack to work.
The idea is that for the prefetcher to consider our prefetching
hint it must not be under high pressure already. We observed in
the previous experiment that omitting the sched_yield syscall
causes the address-translation attack to fail. Hence, we run the
experiment with no sched_yield syscalls but with a large number
of context switches using interrupts, e.g., by running stress -i or
stress -d. Our results show that there is indeed another source
of leakage resulting in cache fetches: whilst syscall handling is a
primary source of leakage, further leakage occurs due to either
context switching or handling of interrupts.
We first investigate whether the sched_yield in the address-
translation attack can be replaced by other syscalls.We discover that
other syscalls e.g., gettid, pipe, write, expose a similar number of
cache fetches. This shows that sched_yield can be replaced with
arbitrary syscalls.
We then investigate whether there might be another leakage
source, in particular whether context switches or interrupts trigger
leakage. We create another experiment where one process fills
the registers with a chosen address in a loop, but never performs
a syscall. Another process runs Flush+Reload in a loop on this
specific address. We observe about 15 cache fetches per second
on this address if the process filling the registers gets interrupted
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continuously, e.g., due to NVMe interrupts, keystrokes, window
events, or mouse movement.
These hits appear to be similarly caused by speculative execution
in the interrupt handler. Hence, we conclude that the essential part
is performing syscalls or interrupts while specific registers are filled
with an attacker-chosen address.
3.4 H4: userspace_accessible bit required
The fourth hypothesis is that user-mapped kernel pages are re-
quired, i.e., access is prevented via the userspace_accessible bit.
We constructed an experiment where we allocate several pages
of memory with mmap. Cache linesA and B are on different pages in
this mmap’d region. The loop (in user space) dereferencesA and then
reloads and flushes it to see whether it was cached in each loop iter-
ation. In the last loop iteration only, we speculatively exchange the
register value A with either the address of B or the direct-physical
map address of B. Hence, both the architectural and speculative
dereferences happen at the same instruction pointer value and in
the same register. If we are training a hardware prefetcher based
on the register values, we can expect it to prefetch B into the cache
in the speculative run. When dereferencing B directly, it is usually
cached after the loop when the direct-physical map address of B is
used. However, when we dereference Awith its value speculatively
exchanged for either the address of B or the direct-physical map
address of B, B is never cached after the final run.
When disabling interrupts, we observe no cache hits on B on
an Intel i7-4760HQ, i7-8700K, and an AMD Phenom II 1090t. As a
null hypothesis test, we perform the same test but also access A in
the last round. We then should not see any cache hits on address
B. And indeed, none of our CPUs fetched B into the cache in this
scenario.
We constructed a second experiment to confirm whether the
root cause of the “prefetching” effect lies in the user or kernel space.
While the original address-translation attack fetches addresses in
the kernel direct-physical map, we can also try to fetch user ad-
dresses. However, we discovered that this only works when SMAP
is disabled (using nosmap kernel boot flag). Thus, the root cause
of the address-translation attack is a mechanism that adheres to
SMAP (supervisor-mode access prevention) and is rooted in the
kernel. This also correlates with the finding of Kocher et al. [49]
that speculative execution cannot bypass SMAP. Hence, we can
conclude that the root cause is some form of code execution in the
kernel.
3.5 H5: Effect only on Intel CPUs
The fifth hypothesis is that the “prefetching” effect only occurs on
Intel CPUs. We assume that all types of CPUs vulnerable to Spectre
are also affected by the speculative dereferencing in the kernel [49].
Thus, we evaluate the same experiment explained in Section 3.4
on an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1920X (Ubuntu 17.10, 4.13.0-46-
generic), anARMCortex-A57 (Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS, 4.4.38-tegra)
and an IBM Power9 (Ubuntu 18.04, 4.15.0-29). On the AMD Ryzen
Threadripper 1920X, we achieve up to 20 speculative fetches per
second. There, we observed a cache hit rate of 0.0004% on B, which
is the standard false positive rate we observed for Flush+Reload
attacks on this CPU. On the Cortex-A57, we observe 5 speculative
1 ;<do_syscall_64+106>
2 => 0xffffffff8100134a: callq 0xffffffff81802000
3 => 0xffffffff81802000: jmpq *%rax
4 ; with retpoline
5 => 0xffffffff81802000: callq 0xffffffff8180200c
6 => 0xffffffff8180200c: mov %rax,(%rsp)
7 => 0xffffffff81802010: retq
Listing 4: While processing a syscall, the kernel performs
multiple indirect jumps, e.g., one to the corresponding
syscall handler. With retpoline [90], the kernel uses a retq
for the indirect jump. Without retpoline the jmp instruction
is used on a pointer in a register.
Kernel
indirect jmp
VA
DPM address
DPM address
DPM address
DPM address
DPM address
mov (%rdx), %rax
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
pr
ed
ict
ed
cache line
rax
.
.
.
r15
1. Fill registers with DPM address
2. Interrupt/Syscall
3. Cache fetch
Handler A Handler B
Figure 2: The kernel speculatively dereferences the direct-
physical map address (DPM). With Flush+Reload, we ob-
serve cache hits on the corresponding user-space address.
fetches per second, and on the IBM Power9, we detect up to 15 spec-
ulative fetches per second. We do not observe any false positives
on the ARM and Power9 CPUs during this experiment.
We run the same experiment on a Raspberry Pi 3 (ARM Cortex-
A53,Ubuntu 18.04, kernel 4.15.0), an in-order CPU with no branch
prediction [4]. Thus, this CPU is not susceptible to any Spectre-type
attacks. Running the same code for 1 hour, we do not observe any
cache fetches. Therefore, as no leakage appears on an in-order CPU
without branch prediction, the effect must be related to Spectre.
The hypothesis that the effect is hardware-specific to Intel CPUs
is incorrect; any CPU susceptible to Spectre-BTB is vulnerable to
speculative dereferencing in the kernel if the mitigations are not
enabled.
3.6 Speculative Execution in the Kernel
From the previous analysis of the hypotheses, we can conclude
that the leakage is not due to the software or hardware prefetchers
but due to speculative code execution in the kernel. While this
conclusion might not be suprising with the knowledge of Spectre,
Spectre was only discovered one year after the original prefetch
paper [22] was published. We now show that the primary leakage
is caused by Spectre-BTB-SA-IP (branch target buffer, training in
same address space, and in-place) [11].
First, we observe that during a syscall, the kernel performs multi-
ple indirect jumps to execute the corresponding system-call handler
(cf. Listing 4). With retpoline, the kernel uses a retq for the indi-
rect jump, which traps the speculative execution path to a fixed
branch. Without retpoline, the jmp instruction is used on a pointer
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in a register. This causes speculative execution based on Spectre-
BTB-SA-IP. The address-translation attack then succeeds because
different syscalls use a different number of arguments. The unified
interface does not zero out registers that a given syscall does not re-
quire. Consequently, during speculative execution, the CPU might
use an incorrect prediction from the branch-target buffer (BTB) and
speculate into the wrong syscall. Figure 2 illustrates the speculative
execution in the kernel dereferencing. In this misspeculated syscall,
registers containing attacker-chosen addresses are used. This can
either be because the registers were never initialized and instead
still contain the attacker-chosen addresses, or because they are
deliberately initialized to attacker-chosen addresses through the
syscall entry code.
We evaluate the leakage rate of other syscalls and the impact
ofmistraining the branch predictionmechanisms in Section 4. On re-
cent kernels, the leakage completely disappears unless nospectre_v2
(i.e., disable Spectre-BTB countermeasures) is passed as a boot flag.
Disabling the Spectre V2 mitigations is interesting for cloud com-
puting since the mitigations introduce a big performance over-
head [87]. Thus, the address-translation attack is mitigated using
the Spectre-BTB countermeasures and not, as described in previous
work [21, 22], by KAISER (KPTI) [21], or LAZARUS [19].
We observed other speculative execution in the kernel that ex-
poses the same effects. However, we observe 15 speculative fetches
per second on an i5-8250U (kernel 5.0.0-20) if we eliminate the
Spectre-BTB-SA-IP leak from Listing 4, empirically confirming that
this is one of the main leakage sources. As already mentioned, there
are further Spectre gadgets in the interrupt handling.
As Canella et al. [11] showed, there were about 172 unmitigated
Spectre v1 “prefetch” gadgets found in the Linux kernel. These
gadgets enable the same attacks as presented in this paper. Currently
there is no consistent plan to mitigate these gadgets. However, any
prefetch gadget can be used for an address-translation attack [22]
and thus would also re-enable Foreshadow-VMM attacks [94, 98].
As concurrent work showed, there are gadgets in the Linux kernel
which can be used to fetch data into the L1D cache in Xen [100]
and an artificial gadget was exploited by Stecklina [88].
In the case of interrupts, we analyzed the interrupt handling in
the Linux kernel version 4.19.0 and observed that the register values
from r8-r15 are cleared but stored on the stack and restored after
the interrupt. Thus, either there is a misspeculation on old register
values, or the leakage comes from the stored stack values [60].
Additionally, we found several jmp instructions that occur in the
analyzed instruction trace, which might trigger speculative cache
fetches. Again, when using the Spectre-BTB mitigations we could
not detect any leakage while triggering interrupts, showing that
this is a crucial element for the speculative dereferencing.
3.7 Meltdown-L3 and Foreshadow-L3
The speculative dereferencing was also noticed but misattributed
to the prefetcher in subsequent work. For instance, the Meltdown
paper [57] reports that data is fetched from L3 into L1 while mount-
ing a Meltdown attack. Van Bulck et al. [94] did not observe this
prefetching effect for Foreshadow. Based on this observation, fur-
ther works also mentioned this effect without analyzing it thor-
oughly [11, 68, 96]. In SpeechMiner the explanation provided is
that performing a Meltdown-US attack causes data to be repeatedly
prefetched from L1 to L3 [103].
We used similar Meltdown-L3 setups as SpeechMiner [103]
and Meltdown [57]. For this purpose, we contacted the authors to
ask for their specific experiment setup. According to the authors
of SpeechMiner [103], the kernel boot flags nopti, nokaslr were
used on kernel 4.4.0-134. We used Ubuntu 16.04 on an Intel i7-6700K
to reproduce the attack. The authors of Meltdown used Ubuntu
16.10 (kernel 4.8.0), which at that moment of writing did not have
any mitigations against Spectre at all [57].
We construct our Meltdown-L3 experiment as follows. One phys-
ical core constantly accesses a secret to ensure that the value stays
in the L3, as the L3 is shared across all physical cores. On a differ-
ent physical core, we run Meltdown on the direct-physical map.
On recent Linux kernels with full Spectre v2 mitigations imple-
mented, we could not reproduce the result on the same machine
with the default mitigations enabled. With the nospectre_v2 flag,
our Meltdown-L3 attack works again when triggering the prefetch
gadget in the kernel. Since we run Meltdown on the direct-physical
map, we place the corresponding direct-physical map address in a
register. Now, when a syscall is performed, or an interrupt is trig-
gered, the direct-physical map address is speculatively dereferenced,
causing the data to be fetched into L1.
Concluding the above experiment, on Linux kernels 4.4.0-137 and
4.8, as respectively used in SpeechMiner [103] and Meltdown [57],
not all Spectre-BTB mitigations such as IBPB and RSB stuffing were
implemented. Thus, the Meltdown-L3 prefetching works because
these mitigations are not implemented on these kernel versions [59].
Without our new insights that the prefetching effect is caused by
speculative execution, it is almost inevitable to not misdesign these
experiments, inevitably leading to incomplete or incorrect obser-
vations and conclusions on Meltdown and Foreshadow and their
mitigations. We confirmed with the authors that their experiment
design was not robust to our new insight and therefore lead to
wrong conclusions.
Foreshadow-L3¸ The same prefetching effect can be used to
perform Foreshadow [94]. If a secret is present in the L3 cache and
the direct-physical map address is derefenced in the hypervisor
kernel, data can be fetched into the L1. This reenables Foreshadow
even with Foreshadow mitigations enabled if the unrelated Spectre-
BTB mitigations are disabled. We demonstrate this attack in KVM
in Section 6.
In Meltdown and Foreshadow, as in other transient-execution
attacks, common implementations transmit a secret byte from the
transient-execution realm via a Flush+Reload cache covert channel
to the architectural realm. Most implementations transmit 1 byte of
data by accessing one of 256 offsets in an array. Several papers, in-
cluding Meltdown and Foreshadow, observed a bias towards the ‘0’
index, where a secret value of ‘0’ is falsely reported to the attacker.
This effect was observed and explained by the zeroing of invalid
loads [57, 94]. We also tried to reproduce these results. However, we
only observed a bias towards zero on systems with hardware miti-
gations against Meltdown and Foreshadow, which by design return
zeros in these attack scenarios [10]. We observed no bias towards
zero on other systems with the most recent software patches and
software mitigations. To transmit a value of ‘0’ through the Flush+
Reload covert channel, the offset ‘0’ is accessed, i.e., the array base
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Table 1: Evaluated systems, their CPUs, operating systems,
and kernel versions used in the syscall evaluation.
CPU Operating System Kernel
Intel i5-8250U Linux Mint 19 4.15.0-52
Intel i7-8700K Ubuntu 18.04 4.15.0-55
ARM Cortex-A57 Ubuntu 16.04.6 4.4.38-tegra
AMD Threadripper 1920X Ubuntu 17.10 4.13.0-46
address. However, the Flush+Reload array base address is stored in
a register during the Flush+Reload loop. Thus, the base address is
speculatively dereferenced due to interrupts and the sched_yield
found in the Flush+Reload loops in these implementations. This
indicates that the speculative dereferencing of user-space registers
creates at least part of the zero bias, if not all, since the bias is no
longer visible onmore recent systems with full software mitigations
against Spectre enabled.
4 IMPROVING THE LEAKAGE RATE
With the knowledge that the root cause of the prefetching effect
is speculative execution in the kernel, we can try to optimize the
number of cache fetches. As already observed in Section 3.3, the
sched_yield syscall can be replaced by an arbitrary syscall to
perform the address-translation attack. In this section, we compare
different syscalls and their impact on the number of speculative
cache fetches on different architectures and kernel versions. We
investigate the impact of executing additional syscalls before and
after the register filling and measure their effects on the number of
speculative cache fetches.
Setup. Table 1 lists the test systems used in our experiments. On
the Intel and AMD CPUs, we disabled the Spectre-BTB mitigations
using the kernel flag nospectre_v2. On the evaluated ARM CPU,
Spectre-BTB mitigations are not supported by the tested firmware.
We evaluate the speculative dereferencing using different syscalls
to observe whether the number of cache fetches increases. Based
on the number of correct and incorrect cache fetches of two virtual
addresses, we calculate the F1-score, i.e., the harmonic average of
precision and recall.
When performing a syscall, the CPU might mispredict the target
syscall based on the results of the BTB. If a misprediction occurs, an-
other syscall which dereferences the values of user-space registers
might be speculatively executed. Therefore if we perform syscalls
before we fill the registers with the direct-physical map address,
we might mistrain the BTB and trigger the CPU to speculatively
execute the mistrained syscall. We evaluate the mistraining of the
BTB for sched_yield in Appendix A.
We create a framework that runs the experiment from Section 3.4
with 20 different syscalls (after filling the registers) and computes
the F1-score. We perform different syscalls before filling the regis-
ters to mistrain the branch prediction. One direct-physical-map ad-
dress has a corresponding mapping to a virtual address and should
trigger speculative fetches into the cache. The other direct-physical-
map address should not produce any cache hits on the same virtual
address. If there is a cache hit on the correct virtual address, we
count it as a true positive. Conversely, if there is no hit when there
should have been one, we count it as a false negative. On the second
address, we count the false positives and true negatives. For syscalls
Table 2: F1-Scores for speculative cache fetches with differ-
ent syscalls on different CPU architectures.
Syscall Syscall executed before i5-8250U i7-8700K Threadripper 1920X Cortex-A57
sched_yield
None 66.40% 91.49% 99.29% 76.61%
send-to 56.42% 4.60% 52.94% 44.88%
geteuid 46.62% 1.90% 63.94% 48.82%
stat 77.37% 57.44% 69.28% 63.57%
pipe
None 100% 99.35% 100% 100%
send-to 99.9% 99.60% 100% 100%
geteuid 99.9% 99.61% 100% 100%
stat 99.9% 99.55% 99.9% 100%
read
None 10.42% 0.09% 8.50% 57.95%
send-to 14.47% 21.26% 1.90% 78.86%
geteuid 15.32% 56.73% 2.35% 73.73%
stat 28.32% 24.07% 9.70% 23.32%
write
None 7.69% 91.24% 76.46% 58.95%
send-to 14.29% 9.88% 11.00% 45.68%
geteuid 15.49% 32.21% 52.94% 49.47%
stat 9.16% 9.70% 52.83% 12.03%
nanosleep
None 21.2% 27.43% 52.61% 87.40%
send-to 46.59% 13.43% 76.23% 82.83%
geteuid 29.93% 96.05% 89.62% 69.63%
stat 59.84% 99.14% 89.68% 77.67%
with parameters, e.g., mmap, we set the value of all parameters to
the direct-physical-map address, i.e., mmap(addr, addr, addr,
addr, addr, addr). We repeat this experiment 1000 times for
each syscall on each system and compute the F1-Score.
Evaluation. We evaluate different syscalls for branch prediction
mistraining by executing a single syscall before and after filling
the registers with the target address. Table 2 lists the F1-scores of
syscalls which achieved the highest number of cache fetches after
filling registers with addresses. The results show that the same
effects occur on both AMD and ARM CPUs, with similar F1-scores.
Executing the pipe syscall after filling the register seems to
always trigger speculative dereferencing in the kernel on each ar-
chitecture. However, this syscall has to perform many operations
and takes 3 to 5 times longer to execute than sched_yield. On re-
cent Linux kernels (version 5), we observe that the number of cache
fetches decreases. This is due to a change in the implementation
of the syscall handler, and thus other paths need to be executed
to increase the probability of speculative dereferencing. We ob-
serve that an additional, different, syscall executed before filling
the registers also mistrains the branch prediction. Thus, we also
compare the number of cache fetches with an additional syscall
added before the registers are filled. If we add additional syscalls like
stat, sendto, or geteuid before filling the registers, we achieve
higher F1-scores in some cases. For instance, executing the syscalls
read and nanosleep after the register filling performs significantly
better (up to 80% higher F1-scores) with prior syscall mistraining.
However, as listed in Table 2, not every additional syscall increases
the number of cache fetches.
5 COVERT CHANNEL
For the purpose of a systematic analysis, we evaluate the capacity
of our discovered information leakage by building a covert channel.
Note that while covert channels assume a colluding sender and
receiver, it is considered best practice to evaluate the maximum
performance of a side channel by building a covert channel. Similar
to previous works [75, 99], our covert channel works without shared
memory and across CPU cores. The capacity of the covert channel
indicates an upper bound for potential attacks where the attacker
and victim are not colluding.
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Figure 3: The setup for the covert channel. The receiver al-
locates a page accessible through the virtual address v. The
sender uses the direct-physical mapping p of the page to in-
fluence the cache state.
Setup. Figure 3 shows the covert-channel setup. The receiver
allocates a memory page which is used for the communication.
The receiver can access the page through the virtual address v .
Furthermore, the receiver retrieves the direct-physical-map address
p of this page. This can be done, i.e., using the virtual-to-physical
address-translation technique we analyzed in Section 3. The address
p is used by the sender to transmit data to the receiver. The address
p also maps to the page, but as it is a kernel address, a user program
cannot access the page via this virtual address. The direct-physical-
map address p is a valid kernel address for every process. Moreover,
as the shared last-level cache is physically indexed and physically
tagged, it does not matter for the cache which virtual address is
used to access the page.
Transmission. The transmitted data is encoded into the cache
state by either caching a cache line of the receiver page (‘1’-bit) or
not caching the cache line of the receiver page (‘0’-bit). To cache a
cache line of the receiver page, the sender uses Spectre-BTB-SA-IP
in the kernel to speculatively access the kernel address p. For this,
the sender constantly fills all x86-64 general-purpose registers with
the kernel address p and performs a syscall. The kernel address is
then speculatively dereferenced in the kernel and the CPU caches
the chosen cache line of the receiver page. Hence, we can use this
primitive to transmit one bit of information. To synchronize the
two processes, we define a time window per bit for sender and
receiver. On the receiver side, we reaccess the same cache line to
check whether the address v , i.e., the first cache line of the receiver
page, is cached. After the access, the receiver flushes the address v
to repeat the measurement. A cache hit is interpreted as a ‘1’-bit.
Conversely, if the sender wants to transmit a ‘0’-bit, the sender
does not write the value into the registers and instead waits until
the time window is exceeded. Thus, if the receiver encounters a
cache miss, it is interpreted as a ‘0’-bit.
Evaluation. We evaluated the covert channel by transmitting
random messages between two processes running on different
physical CPU cores. Our test system was equipped with an Intel
i7-6500U CPU, running Linux Mint 19 (kernel 4.15.0-52-generic,
nospectre_v2 boot flag).
In our setup, we transmit 128 bytes from the sender to the re-
ceiver and run the experiment 50 times. We observed that additional
interrupts on the core where the syscall is performed increases
the performance of the covert channel. These interrupts trigger
the speculative execution we observed in the interrupt handler. In
particular, I/O interrupts, i.e., syncing the NVMe device, create ad-
ditional cache fetches. While we achieved a transmission rate of up
to 30 bit/s, at this rate we had a high standard error of approx. 1%.
We achieved the highest capacity at a transmission rate of 10 bit/s.
Virtual machine Hypervisor
Int./Hypercall with VA
Foreshadow on PA Fetch into cachePage
cache line
Figure 4: If a guest-chosen address is speculatively fetched
into the cache during a hypercall or interrupt and not
flushed before the virtual machine is resumed, the attacker
can perform a Foreshadow attack to leak the fetched data.
At this rate, the standard error is, on average, 0.1%. This result is
comparable to related work in similar scenarios [75, 99]. To achieve
an error-free transmission, error-correction techniques [62] can be
used. Compared to to the Flush+Prefetch covert channel demon-
strated by Gruss et al. [22] is that our covert channel does not
require any shared memory. Thus, while slower, it is more powerful
as it can be used in a wider range of scenarios.
6 SPECULATIVE DEREFERENCES AND
VIRTUAL MACHINES
In this section, we examine speculative dereferencing in virtual ma-
chines. We demonstrate a successful end-to-end attack using inter-
rupts from a virtual-machine guest running under KVM on a Linux
host [15]. The attack succeeds even with the recommended Fore-
shadow mitigations enabled, provided that the unrelated Spectre-
BTB mitigations are disabled. Against our expectations, we did not
observe any speculative dereferencing of guest-controlled registers
in Microsoft’s Hyper-V HyperClear Foreshadow mitigation. We
provide a thorough analysis of this negative result.
Since we observe speculative dereferencing in the syscall han-
dling, we investigate whether hypercalls trigger a similar effect.
The attacker targets a specific host-memory location where the host
virtual address and physical address are known but inaccessible.
Foreshadow Attack on Virtualization Software. If an address
from the host is speculatively fetched into the L1 cache on a hy-
percall from the guest, we expect it to have a similar speculative-
dereferencing effect. With the speculative memory access in the
kernel, we can fetch arbitrary memory from L2, L3, or DRAM into
the L1 cache. Consequently, Foreshadow can be used on arbitrary
memory addresses provided the L1TFmitigations in use do not flush
the entire L1 data cache [88, 91, 100]. Figure 4 illustrates the attack
using hypercalls or interrupts and Foreshadow. The attacking guest
loads a host virtual address into the registers used as hypercall
parameters and then performs hypercalls. If there is a prefetching
gadget in the hypercall handler and the CPU misspeculates into
this gadget, the host virtual address is fetched into the cache. The
attacker then performs a Foreshadow attack and leaks the value
from the loaded virtual address.
6.1 Foreshadow on Patched Linux KVM
Concurrent work showed that prefetching gadgets in the kernel, in
combination with L1TF, can be exploited on Xen and KVM [88, 100].
The default setting on Ubuntu 19.04 (kernel 5.0.0-20) is to only
conditionally flush the L1 data cache upon VM entry via KVM [91],
which is also the case for Kali Linux (kernel 5.3.9-1kali1). The L1
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data cache is only flushed in nested VM entry scenarios or in situa-
tions where data from the host might be leaked. Since Linux kernel
4.9.81, Linux’s KVM implementation clears all guest clobbered reg-
isters to prevent speculative dereferencing [16]. In our attack, the
guest fills all general-purpose registers with direct-physical-map
addresses from the host.
End-To-End Foreshadow Attack via Interrupts. In Section 3.3,
we observed that context switches triggered by interrupts can also
cause speculative cache fetches. We use the example from Sec-
tion 3.3 to verify whether the “prefetching” effect can also be ex-
ploited from a virtualized environment. In this setup, we virtual-
ize Linux buildroot (kernel 4.16.18) on a Kali Linux host (kernel
5.3.9-1kali1) using qemu (4.2.0) with the KVM backend. In
our experiment, the guest constantly fills a register with a direct-
physical-map address and performs the sched_yield syscall. We
verify with Flush+Reload in a loop on the corresponding host virtual
address that the address is indeed cached. Hence, we can success-
fully fetch arbitrary hypervisor addresses into the L1 cache on
kernel versions before the patch, i.e., with Foreshadow mitigations
but incomplete Spectre-BTB mitigations. We observe about 25 spec-
ulative cache fetches per minute using NVMe interrupts on our
Debian machine. The attacker, running as a guest, can use this
gadget to prefetch data into the L1. Since data is now located in the
L1, this reenables a Foreshadow attack [94], allowing guest-to-host
memory reads. As described before, 25 fetches per minute means
that we can theoretically leak up to 64 · 25 = 1600 bytes per minute
(or 26.7 bytes per second) with a Foreshadow attack despite mitiga-
tions in place. However, this requires a sophisticated attacker who
avoids context switches once the target cache line is cached.
We develop an end-to-end Foreshadow-L3 exploit that works
despite enabled Foreshadow mitigations, provided the unrelated
Spectre-BTB mitigations are disabled. In this attack the host con-
stantly accesses a secret on a physical core, which ensures it remains
in the shared L3 cache. We assign one isolated physical core, con-
sisting of two hyperthreads, to our virtual machine. In the virtual
machine, the attacker fills all registers on one logical core (hyper-
thread) and performs the Foreshadow attack on the other logical
core. Note that this is different from the original Foreshadow attack
where one hyperthread is controlled by the attacker and the sibling
hyperthread is used by the victim. Our scenario is more realistic,
as the attacker controls both hyperthreads, i.e., both hyperthreads
are in the same trust domain. With this proof-of-concept attack
implementation, we are able to leak 7 bytes per minute success-
fully 18. Note that this can be optimized further, as the current
proof-of-concept produces context switches regardless of whether
the cache line is cached or not. Our attack clearly shows that the
recommended Foreshadow mitigations alone are not sufficient to
mitigate Foreshadow attacks, and Spectre-BTB mitigations must be
enabled to fully mitigate our Foreshadow-L3 attack.
NoPrefetching gadget inHypercalls in KVM We track the reg-
ister values in hypercalls and validate whether the register values
from the guest system are speculatively fetched into the cache. We
neither observe that the direct-physical-map address is still located
in the registers nor that it is speculatively fetched into the cache.
18An anonymized demonstration video can be found here:
https://streamable.com/8ke5ub
However, as was shown in concurrent work [88, 100], prefetch
gadgets exist in the kernel that can be exploited to fetch data into
the cache, and these gadgets can be exploited using Foreshadow.
6.2 Negative Result: Foreshadow on Hyper-V
HyperClear
We examined whether the same attack also works on Windows 10
(build 1803.17134), which includes the latest patch for Foreshadow.
As on Linux, we disabled the mitigations for Spectre-BTB and tried
to fetch hypervisor addresses from guest systems into the cache.
Microsoft’s Hyper-V HyperClear Mitigation [65] for Foreshadow
claims to only flush the L1 data cache when switching between
virtual cores. Hence, it should be susceptible to the same basic attack
we described at the beginning of this section. For our experiment,
the attacker passes a known virtual address of a secret variable from
the host operating system for all parameters of a hypercall. However,
we could not find any exploitable timing difference after switching
from the guest to the hypervisor. Our experiments concerning this
negative result are discussed in Appendix C.
7 LEAKING VALUES FROM SGX REGISTERS
In this section, we present a novel method, Dereference Trap, to
leak register contents from an SGX enclave in the presence of only
a speculative register dereference. We show that this technique
can also be generalized and applied to other contexts. Leaking
the values of registers is useful, e.g., to extract parts of keys or
intermediate values from cryptographic operations. While there
are already Spectre attacks on SGX enclaves [12, 69], they require
the typical Spectre-PHT gadget [49], i.e., a double indirect memory
access after a conditional branch.
7.1 Dereference Trap
For Dereference Trap, we exploit transient code paths inside an
enclave which speculatively dereference a register containing a
secret value. The setup is similar to the kernel case we examined in
Section 3.6. An SGX enclave has access to the entire virtual address
space [37]. Hence, any speculative memory access to a valid virtual
address caches the data at this address.
The basic idea of Dereference Trap is to ensure that the entire
virtual address space of the application is mapped. Thus, if a register
containing a secret is speculatively dereferenced, the corresponding
virtual address is cached. The attacker can detect which virtual
address is cached and infer the secret. However, in practice, there
are two main challenges which must be resolved to implement
Dereference Trap. Firstly, the virtual address space is much larger
than the physical address space. Thus it is not possible to simply
map all virtual addresses to physical addresses. Secondly, the Flush+
Reload attack is a bottleneck, as even a highly-optimized Flush+
Reload attack takes around 300 CPU cycles [80]. Hence, probing
every cache line of the entire user-accessible virtual address space
of 247 bytes would require around 2 days on a 4 GHzCPU.Moreover,
probing this many cache lines does not work as the cached address
does not remain in the cache if many other addresses are accessed.
Divide and Conquer. Instead of mapping every page in the vir-
tual address space to its own physical pages, we only map 2 physical
pages p1 and p2, as illustrated in Figure 5. By leveraging shared
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Flush+Reload
Physical Page p1 Physical Page p2
v0 ... v n2 −1 v n2 ... vn−1
Register Value (between v0 and vn−1)
Dereference
Test
Figure 5: Leaking the value of an x86 general-purpose reg-
ister using Dereference Trap and Flush+Reload on two dif-
ferent physical addresses. v0 to vn−1 represent the memory
mappings on one of the shared memory regions.
memory, we can map one physical page multiple times into the
virtual address space. By default, the number of mmaped segments
which can be mapped simultaneously is limited to 65 536 [45]. How-
ever, as the attacker in the SGX threat model is privileged [37] we
can easily disable this limit. The maximum allowed value is 231 − 1,
which makes it possible to map 1/16th of the user-accessible vir-
tual address space. If we only consider 32-bit secrets, i.e., secrets
which are stored in the lower half of 64-bit registers, 220 mappings
are sufficient. Out of these, the first 210 virtual addresses map to
physical page p1 and the second 210 addresses map to page p2. Con-
sequently the majority of 32-bit values are now valid addresses that
either map to p1 or p2. Thus, after a 32-bit secret is speculatively
dereferenced inside the enclave, the attacker only needs to probe
the 64 cache lines of each of the two physical pages. A cache hit
reveals the most-significant bit (bit 31) of the secret as well as bits
6 to 11, which define the cache-line offset on the page.
To learn the remaining bits 12 to 30, we continue in a fashion
akin to binary-search. We unmap all mappings to p1 and p2 and
create half as many mappings as before. Again, half of the new
mappings map to p1 and half of the new mappings map to p2. From
a cache hit in this setup, we can again learn one bit of the secret.
We can repeat these steps until all bits from bit 6 to 31 of the secret
are known. As the granularity of Flush+Reload is one cache line,
we cannot leak the least-significant 6 bits of the secret.
As a privileged attacker, we can also disable the hardware prefetch-
ers on Intel CPUs by setting the model-specific register 0x1a4 to
15 [97]. This prevents spurious cache hits, which is especially im-
portant for probing the cache lines on a single page.
We evaluated Dereference Trap on our test system and recovered
a 32-bit value stored in a 64-bit register within 15 minutes.
7.2 Speculative Type Confusion
SGX registers are invisible to the kernel and can thus not be spec-
ulatively dereferenced from outside SGX. Hence, the dereference
gadget has to be inside the enclave. While there is a mechanism
similar to a context switch when an enclave is interrupted, we could
not find such a gadget in either the current SGX SDK or driver code.
This is unsurprising, as this code is hardened with memory fences
for nearly all memory loads to prevent LVI [95] as well as other
transient-execution attacks.
1 class Object {
2 public:
3 virtual void print() = 0;
4 };
5 class Dummy : public Object {
6 private:
7 char* data;
8 public:
9 Dummy() { data = "TEST"; }
10 virtual void print() { puts(data); }
11 };
12 class Secret : public Object {
13 private:
14 size_t secret;
15 public:
16 Secret() { secret = 0x12300000; }
17 virtual void print() { }
18 };
19 void printObject(Object* o) { o->print(); }
Listing 5: Speculative type confusion which leaks the secret
of Secret class instances using Dereference Trap.
Hence, to leak secret registers using Dereference Trap, the gadget
must be in the enclave code. Such a gadget can easily be introduced,
e.g., when using polymorphism in C++. Listing 5 shows a minimal
example of introducing such a gadget.
The virtual functions are implemented using vtables for which
the compiler emits an indirect call in Line 19. The branch predictor
for this indirect call learns the last call target. Thus, if the call target
changes because the type of the object is different, speculative
execution still executes the function of the last object with the data
of the current object.
In this code, calling printObject first with an instance of Dummy
mistrains the branch predictor to call Dummy::print, dereferencing
the first member of the class. A subsequent call to printObject
with an instance of Secret leads to speculative execution of Dummy::print.
However, the dereferenced member is now the secret (Line 16) of
the Secret class.
The speculative type confusion in such a code construct leads to
a speculative dereference of a value which would never be derefer-
enced architecturally. We can leak this speculatively dereferenced
value using the Dereference Trap attack.
However, there are also many different causes for such gad-
gets [32], e.g., function pointers or (compiler-generated) jump ta-
bles.
7.3 Generalization of Dereference Trap
Dereference Trap is a generic technique which also applies to any
other scenario where the attacker can set up the hardware and
address space accordingly. Dereference Trap applies to all Spectre
variants. Thus, Spectre-v2 mitigations alone are not sufficient to
hinder Dereference Trap. Many in-place Spectre-v1 gadgets that are
not the typical encoding array gadget are still entirely unprotected
with no plans to change this. For instance, Intel systems before
Haswell and AMD systems before Zen do not support SMAP. Also,
more recent systems may have SMAP disabled. On these systems,
we can also mmapmemory regions and the kernel will dereference 32-
bit values misinterpreted as pointers (into user space). We prepared
an experiment where a kernel module speculatively accesses a
secret value. The user-space process performs the Dereference Trap.
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Using this technique the attacker can reliably leak a 32-bit secret
which is speculatively dereferenced by the kernel module using
an artificial Spectre gadget. Cryptographic implementations often
store keys in the lower 32 bits of 64bit registers (OpenSSLAES round
key u32 *rk; for instance) [70]. Hence, those implementations might
be susceptible to Dereference Trap.
We evaluated the same experiment on an Intel i5-8250U, ARM
Cortex-A57, and AMD ThreadRipper 1920X with the same result of
15 minutes to recover a 32-bit secret. Thus, Spectre-BTBmitigations
and SMAP must remain enabled to mitigate attacks like Dereference
Trap.
8 LEAKING PHYSICAL ADDRESSES FROM
JAVASCRIPT USINGWEBASSEMBLY
In this section, we present an attack that leaks the physical ad-
dress (cache-line granularity) of a variable from within a JavaScript
context. Our main goal is to show that the “prefetching” effect
is much simpler than described in the original paper [22], i.e., it
does not require native code execution. The only requirement for
the environment is that it can keep a 64-bit register filled with an
attacker-controlled 64-bit value.
In contrast to the original paper’s attempt to use NaCl to run in
native code in the browser, we describe how to create a JavaScript-
based attack to leak physical addresses from Javascript variables
and evaluate its performance in common JavaScript engines and
Firefox.We demonstrate that it is possible to fill 64-bit registers with
an attacker-controlled value in JavaScript by using WebAssembly.
Attack Setup. JavaScript encodes numbers as double-precision
floating-point values in the IEEE 754 format [66]. Thus, it is not pos-
sible to store a full 64-bit value into a register with vanilla JavaScript,
as the maximum precision is only 53-bit. The same is true for Big-
Integer libraries, which represent large numbers as structures on the
heap [92]. To overcome this limitation, we leverage WebAssembly,
a binary instruction format which is precompiled for the JavaScript
engine and not further optimized by the engine [92]. The precom-
piled bytecode can be loaded and instantiated in JavaScript. To
prevent WebAssembly from harming the system, the bytecode is
limited to calling functions provided by the JavaScript scope.
Our test operating system is Debian 8 (kernel5.3.9-1kali1)
on an Intel i7-8550U. We observe that on this system registers r9
and r10 are speculatively dereferenced in the kernel. In our attack,
we focus on filling these specific registers with a guessed direct-
physical-map address of a variable. The WebAssembly method
load_pointer of Listing 6 (Appendix B) takes two 32-bit JavaScript
values, which are combined into a 64-bit value and populated into
as many registers as possible. To trigger interrupts we rely on web
requests from JavaScript, as suggested by Lipp et al. [55].
We can use our attack to leak the direct-physical-map address
of any variable in JavaScript. The attack works analogously to the
address-translation attack in native code [22].
(1) Guess a physical address p for the variable and compute the
corresponding direct-physical map address d(p).
(2) Load d(p) into the required registers (load_pointer) in an end-
less loop, e.g., using endless-loop slicing [55].
(3) The kernel fetches d(p) into the cache when interrupted.
(4) Use Evict+Reload on the target variable. On a cache hit, the
physical address guess p from Step 1 was correct. Otherwise,
continue with the next guess.
Attack from within Browsers. Before evaluating our attack in
an unmodified Firefox browser, we evaluate our experiment on
the JavaScript engines V8 version 7.7 and Spidermonkey 60. To
verify our experiments, we use Kali Linux (kernel 5.3.9-1kali1)
running on an Intel i7-8550U. As it is the engines that execute our
WebAssembly, the same register filling behavior as in the browser
should occur when the engines are executed standalone. In both
engines, we use the C-APIs to add native code functions [67, 93],
enabling us to execute syscalls such as sched_yield. This shortcuts
the search to find JavaScript code that constantly triggers syscalls.
Running inside the engine with the added syscall, we achieve a
speed of 20 speculative fetches per second. In addition to testing in
the standalone JavaScript engines, we also show that speculative
dereferencing can be triggered in the browser. We mount an attack
in an unmodified Firefox 76.0 by injecting interrupts via web re-
quests.We observe up to 2 speculative fetches per hour. If the logical
core running the code is constantly interrupted, e.g., due to disk I/O,
we achieve up to 1 speculative fetch per minute. As this attack leaks
parts of the physical and virtual address, it can be used to imple-
ment various microarchitectural attacks [20, 23, 49, 71, 75, 79, 83].
Hence, the address-translation attack is possible with JavaScript
and WebAssembly, without requiring the NaCl sandbox as in the
original paper [22].
Upcoming JavaScript extensions expose syscalls to JavaScript [13].
However, at the time of writing, no such extensions are enabled by
default. Hence, as the second part of our evaluation, we investigate
whether a syscall-based attack would also yield the same perfor-
mance as in native code. To simulate the extension, we expose the
sched_yield syscall to JavaScript. We observe the same perfor-
mance of 20 speculative fetches per second with the syscall function.
Thus, new extensions for JavaScript may improve the performance
of our previously described attack on unmodified Firefox.
Limitations of the Attack. We conclude that the bottleneck of
this attack is triggering syscalls. In particular, there is currently no
way to directly perform a single syscall via Javascript in browsers
without high overhead. We traced the syscalls of Firefox using
strace. We observed that syscalls such as sched_yield, getpid,
stat, sendto are commonly performed upon window events, e.g.,
opening and closing pop-ups or reading and writing events on the
JavaScript console. However, the registers r9 and r10 get overwrit-
ten before the syscall is performed. Thus, whether the registers
are speculatively dereferenced while still containing the attacker-
chosen values strongly depends on the engine’s register allocation
and on other syscalls performed. As Jangda et al. [42] stated, not all
registers are used in Chrome and Firefox in the JIT-generated native
code. Not all registers can be filled from within the browser, e.g.,
Chrome uses the registers r10 and r13 only as scratch registers,
and Firefox uses r15 as the heap pointer [42].
9 DISCUSSION
The “prefetching” of user-space registers was first observed by
Gruss et al. [22] in 2016. In May 2017, Jann Horn discovered that
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speculative execution can be exploited to leak arbitrary data. In Jan-
uary 2018, pre-prints of the Spectre [49] and Meltdown [57] papers
were released. Our results indicate that the address-translation at-
tack was the first inadvertent exploitation of speculative execution,
albeit in a much weaker form where only metadata, i.e., information
about KASLR, is leaked rather than real data as in a full Spectre
attack. Even before the address-translation attack, speculative exe-
cution was well known [77] and documented [35] to cause cache
hits on addresses that are not architecturally accessed. This was
often mentioned together with prefetching [28, 104]. Currently, the
address-translation attack and our variants are mitigated on both
Linux and Windows using the retpoline technique to avoid indi-
rect branches. In particular, the Spectre-BTB gadget in the syscall
wrapper can be fixed by using the lfence instruction.
Another possibility upon a syscall is to save user-space register
values to memory, clear the registers to prevent speculative deref-
erencing, and later restore the user-space values after execution of
the syscall. However, as has been observed in the interrupt handler,
there might still be some speculative cache accesses on values from
the stack. The retpoline mitigation for Spectre-BTB introduces a
large overhead for indirect branches. The performance overhead
can in some cases be up to 50 % [87]. This is particularly problematic
in large scale systems, e.g., cloud data centers, that have to compen-
sate for the performance loss and increased energy consumption.
Furthermore, retpoline breaks CET and CFI technologies and might
thus also be disabled [8]. As an alternative, randpoline [8] could be
used to replace themitigationwith a probabilistic one, again with an
effect on Foreshadow mitigations. And indeed, mitigating memory
corruption vulnerabilities may be more important than mitigating
Foreshadow in certain use cases. Cloud computing concepts that
do not rely on traditional isolation boundaries are already being
explored in industry [2, 14, 30, 64]. Future work should investigate
mitigations which take these new computing concepts into account
rather than enforcing isolation boundaries that are less necessary
in these use cases.
On current CPUs, Spectre-BTB mitigations, including retpoline,
must remain enabled. On newer kernels for ARM Cortex-A CPUs,
the branch prediction results can be discarded, and on certain de-
vices branch prediction can be entirely disabled [3]. Our results
suggest that these mechanisms are required for context switches
or interrupt handling. Additionally, the L1TF mitigations must be
applied on affected CPUs to prevent Foreshadow. Otherwise, we
can still fetch arbitrary hypervisor addresses into the cache. Finally,
our attacks also show that SGX enclaves must be compiled with
the retpoline flag. Even with LVI mitigations, this is currently not
the default setting, and thus all SGX enclaves which speculatively
load secrets are potentially susceptible to Dereference Trap.
10 CONCLUSION
We confirmed the empirical results from several previous works [22,
57, 94, 103] while showing that the underlying root cause was mis-
attributed in these works, resulting in incomplete mitigations [11,
21, 57, 68, 94, 96]. Our experiments clearly show that speculative
dereferencing of a user-space register in the kernel causes the leak-
age. As a result, we were able to improve the performance of the
original attack and show that CPUs from other hardware vendors
like AMD, ARM, and IBM are also affected. We demonstrated that
this effect can also be exploited via JavaScript in browsers, enabling
us to leak the physical addresses of JavaScript variables. To system-
atically analyze the effect, we investigated its leakage capacity by
implementing a cross-core covert channel which works without
shared memory. We presented a novel technique, Dereference Trap,
to leak the values of registers used in SGX (or privileged contexts)
via speculative dereferencing. We demonstrated that it is possible
to fetch addresses from hypervisors into the cache from the guest
operating system by triggering interrupts, enabling Foreshadow
(L1TF) on data from the L3 cache. Our results show that, for now,
retpoline must remain enabled even on recent CPU generations
to fully mitigate high impact microarchitectural attacks such as
Foreshadow.
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A MISTRAINING BTB FOR SCHED_YIELD
We evaluate the mistraining of the BTB by calling different syscalls,
fill all general-purpose registerswithDPMaddress and call sched_yield.
Table 3: Table of syscalls which achieve the highest numbers
of cache fetches, when calling sched_yield after the register
filling.
Syscall Parameters Avg. # cache fetches
readv readv(0,NULL,0); 13766.3
getcwd syscall(79,NULL,0); 7344.7
getcwd getcwd(NULL,0); 6646.9
readv syscall(19,0,NULL,0); 5541.4
mount syscall(165,s_cbuf,s_cbuf,s_cbuf,s_ulong,(void*)s_cbuf); 4831.6
getpeername syscall(52,0,NULL,NULL); 4600.0
getcwd syscall(79,s_cbuf,s_ulong); 4365.8
bind syscall(49,0,NULL,0); 3680.6
getcwd getcwd(s_cbuf,s_ulong); 3619.3
getpeername syscall(52,s_fd,&s_ssockaddr,&s_int); 3589.3
connect syscall(42,s_fd,&s_ssockaddr,s_int); 2951.2
getpeername getpeername(0,NULL,NULL); 2822.4
connect syscall(42,0,NULL,0); 2776.4
getsockname syscall(51,0,NULL,NULL); 2623.4
connect connect(0,NULL,0); 2541.5
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Figure 6: Timings of a cached and uncached variable and the
access time after a hypercall in a Ubuntu VM on Hyper-V.
Our test system was equipped with Ubuntu 18.04 (kernel 4.4.143-
generic) and an Intel i7-6700K. We repeated the experiment by
iterating over various syscalls with different parameters (valid pa-
rameters,NULL as parameters) 10 times with 200 000 repetitions. Ta-
ble 3 lists the best 15 syscalls to mistrain the BTB when sched_yield
is performed afterwards. On this kernel version it appears that the
read and getcwd syscalls mistraing the BTB best if sched_yield is
called after the register filling.
B WEBASSEMBLY REGISTER FILLING
The WebAssembly method load_pointer of Listing 6 takes two
32-bit JavaScript values as input parameters. These two parameters
are loaded into a 64-bit integer variable and stored into multiple
global variables. The global variables are then used as loop exit
conditions in the separate loops. To fill as many registers as possible
with the direct-physical-map address, we create data dependencies
within the loop conditions. In the spec_fetch function, the regis-
ters are filled inside the loop. After the loop, the JavaScript function
yield_wrapper is called. This tries to trigger any syscall or inter-
rupt in the browser by calling JavaScript functions which may incur
syscalls or interrupts. Lipp et al. [55] reported that web requests
from JavaScript trigger interrupts from within the browser.
C NO FORESHADOW ON HYPER-V
HYPERCLEAR
We set up a Hyper-V virtual machine with a Ubuntu 18.04 guest
(kernel 5.0.0-20).We access an address to load it into the cache and
perform a hypercall before accessing the variable and measuring
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1 extern void yield_wrapper();
2 uint64_t G1 = 5;
3 uint64_t G2 = 5;
4 uint64_t G3 = 5;
5 uint64_t G4 = 5;
6 uint64_t G5 = 5;
7 uint64_t value = 0;
8
9 void spec_fetch()
10 {
11 for (uint64_t i = G1+5; i > G1; i--)
12 for (uint64_t k = G3+5; k > G3; k--)
13 for (uint64_t j = G2-5; k < G2; j++)
14 for(uint64_t l = G4; i < G4;l++)
15 for(uint64_t m = G5-5;m<G5;m++)
16 value = l + j + k + i;
17 yield_wrapper();
18 }
19
20 int load_pointer(int high, int low)
21 {
22 uint64_t a = (((uint64_t)high) << 32ull) |
23 ((uint64_t)(unsigned int)low);
24 G1 = a;
25 G2 = a;
26 G3 = a;
27 G4 = a;
28 G5 = a;
29 spec_fetch();
30 return a;
31 }
32
33 int main()
34 {
35 load_pointer(0x12345678,0x9abcdef0);
36 }
Listing 6: WebAssembly code to speculatively fetch an ad-
dress from the kernel direct-physical map into the cache.
We combine this with a state-of-the-art Evict+Reload loop
in JavaScript to determine whether the guess for the direct-
physical map address was correct.
the access time. Since hypercalls are performed from a privileged
mode, we developed a kernel module for our Linux guest machine
which performs our own malicious hypercalls. We observe a timing
difference (see Figure 6) between a memory access which hits in the
L1 cache (dotted), a memory access after a hypercall (grid pattern),
and an uncached memory access (crosshatch dots). We observe that
after each hypercall, the access times are approx. 20 cycles slower.
This indicates that the guest addresses are flushed from the L1 data
cache. In addition, we create a second experiment where we load
a virtual address from a process running on the host into several
registers when performing a hypercall from the guest. On the host
system, we perform Flush+Reload on the virtual address in a loop
and verify whether the virtual address is fetched into the cache. We
do not observe any cache hits on the host process when performing
hypercalls from the guest system. Thus we conclude that either the
L1 cache is always flushed, contradicting the documentation, or
creating a situation where the L1 cache is not flushed requires a
more elaborate attack setup. However, we believe that speculative
dereferencing is the reason why Microsoft adopted the retpoline
mitigation despite having other Spectre-BTB mitigations already
in place.
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